windows 10 – WinRM – Basic Authentication Issue – Unencrypted traffic is currently disabled in the client configuration

I am not exactly sure what is my issue, I think I have everything set correctly. I am trying to test WinRM with simple basic authentication using HTTP (unencrypted) to a Windows 10 machine that has HyperV enabled. This HyperV server is just a system located in my home lab. There is no domain controller/active directory in my setup.

I followed online tutorials to 1) enable basic authentication on both service and client, 2) set allow unencrypted to true and 3) set trusted hosts.

Below is my configuration on the server end on 192.168.98.* subnet.

PS WSMan:localhostClient> winrm get winrm/config/service/auth
Auth
    Basic = true
    Kerberos = true
    Negotiate = true
    Certificate = false
    CredSSP = false
    CbtHardeningLevel = Relaxed

PS WSMan:localhostClient> winrm get winrm/config/client
Client
    NetworkDelayms = 5000
    URLPrefix = wsman
    AllowUnencrypted = true
    Auth
        Basic = true
        Digest = true
        Kerberos = true
        Negotiate = true
        Certificate = true
        CredSSP = false
    DefaultPorts
        HTTP = 5985
        HTTPS = 5986
    TrustedHosts = 192.168.98.86,192.168.20.*

I verified that my listener on 5985 is enabled.

However, when I try to execute a sample command from a client located on 192.168.20.* subnet, I got the following:

PS C:Usersdchu> winrm identify -r:http://192.168.98.86:5985 -auth:basic -u:beyonddc -p:fooPassword -encoding:utf-8
WSManFault
    Message = The WinRM client cannot process the request. Unencrypted traffic is currently disabled in the client configuration. Change the client configuration and try the request again.

Error number:  -2144108322 0x803380DE
The WinRM client cannot process the request. Unencrypted traffic is currently disabled in the client configuration. Change the client configuration and try the request again.
PS C:Usersdchu>

Much appreciated if someone can shed me some light. Thanks!!!

backup – How to save all WhatsApp messages and media unencrypted?

I’m planning to quit Whatsapp but I would like to save an unencrypted record of my messages plus all the media files that are still on my phone. From existing solutions, I found some shortcomings such as no exporting of group chats or a 40k message limit. What is the method that best circumvents these limitations?

While I have the android app, I’d be open for a Mac or PC solution.

Is there any differences in what will be backed up between an encrypted and unencrypted Time Machine Backup?

I do make encrypted Time Machine backups to my Synology NAS which works exactly how I want it. But I recently had to restore from that backup and it’s obviously very slow.
Since this was a planned restore I thought next time I’ll do an unencrypted backup to my external SSD right before restoring and will have a much faster restore.

  1. Am I right that restoring from an unencrypted backup will be faster?
  2. Is there anything that Time Machine does not include into an unencrypted backup which would be included into an encrypted one?

Does SQL Server supports both encrypted and unencrypted connections at the same time?

Is it possible to have encrypted and unencrypted connections on the same port (1433)? If so, how?

encryption – Solution to User Initial HTTP Requests Unencrypted Despite HTTPS Redirection?

It is my understanding that requests from a client browser to a webserver will initially follow the specified protocol e.g, HTTPS, and default to HTTP if not specified (Firefox Tested). On the server side it is desired to enforce a strict type HTTPS for all connections for the privacy of request headers and as a result HTTPS redirections are used. The problem is that any initial request where the client does not explicitly request HTTPS will be sent unencrypted. For example, client instructs browser with the below URL command.

google.com/search?q=unencrypted-get

google.com will redirect the client browser to use HTTPS but the initial HTTP request and GET parameters were already sent unencrypted possibly compromising the privacy of the client. Obviously there is nothing full-proof that can be done by the server to mitigate this vulnerability but:

  1. Could this misuse compromise the subsequent TLS security possibly through a known-plaintext
    attack (KPA)?
  2. Are there any less obvious measures that can be done to mitigate this possibly through some
    DNS protocol solution?
  3. Would it be sensible for a future client standard to always initially attempt with HTTPS as the default?

http – Downloading unencrypted data with Android app

I’m writing a relatively simple app for Android, which should get GPS coordinates and detect if the device is inside one of defined polygons. These polygon definitions I intend to download from a server through an unencrypted connection before the app launches its GPS activities. The polygon data is created by users and they should enter the address into the app and it will connect and download that JSON data.

So the main question is about that download process security: is it safe to transfer that data openly or should I bother with encryption?

One way I imagined is to make the users to encrypt the JSON data. Before they download it, they should input not only address, but also a password to decrypt that data, so the app can decrypt it after the download. Is there any point in doing this? Or should I do proper authorization (which I consider excessively complex for this case)?

encryption – What is the threat model for deciding between unencrypted and encrypted EBS volumes?

Let me start by saying that I am not questioning the usefulness of encrypting EBS volumes, nor am I asking how it works.

I'm just wondering what does specific EBS volume encryption protect against?

For my personal laptop, the reason for encrypting the hard drive is in case of theft, while the thief could create a copy of my hard drive, the data is encrypted at rest and cannot be decrypted without connecting to my computer portable and / or provide the decryption key.

For a not encrypted EBS volume attached to an EC2, I assume the data is only accessible by the EC2 to which it is attached. Or at least, the data cannot be accessed by anyone / person outside of EC2 without specifically authorizing access to it. Is this assumption false?

If this assumption is correct, then encryption EBS volume protects against … what? The possibility that the hard drive is stolen from Amazon's data center? Or I suppose someone could infiltrate their network and digitally copy the data from the hard drives, which would then be encrypted?

I'm just curious about the threat model.

Does a DoS and DDoS attack only work on unencrypted systems or sites?

I wonder if an attack Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) only work on web servers without https protocol or other systems without encryption?

ip – Access to unencrypted WAN traffic

An unencrypted TCP connection in basic plain text is configured as follows:

LAN of the network client <----> Network modem <--> ISP <--> Remote server

The network modem has only one wired user and no one can detect LAN packets.

TCP packets are generated on the network client under the local network. The network modem sends packets to the ISP and then to a remote server.

assume

  1. The local and remote server is completely trusted. No LAN traffic can be detected at one or the other end.

  2. The ISP itself is approved or is allowed to see the traffic, and they are not compromised.

Is there a way for hackers to see unencrypted packets during their WAN journey? They know both the source IP address and the destination IP address. Can they sniff this traffic?

hash – Do digested passwords sent on an unencrypted channel provide additional security over plain text passwords?

I'm getting to know WS-Security and I'm trying to compare different options offered by UsernameToken as described in this document.

As far as I know, a digested password is a password hash in plain text with a nuncio and a date. This prevents replay attacks and the need to send the password in plain text:

Password_Digest = Base64 ( SHA-1 ( nonce + created + password ) )

According to the document, what will be sent looks like this:


    
        NNK
        weYI3nXd8LjMNVksCKFV8t3rgHh3Rw==
        WScqanjCEAC4mQoBE07sAQ==
        2003-07-16T01:24:32Z
    

What I do not understand is this part (page 6):

Passwords of type PasswordDigest are defined as Base64.
(XML-Schema) encoded, hash value SHA-1 of UTF8
password (or equivalent). However, unless this password digested
is sent on a secure channel where the token is encrypted, the summary
offers no real additional security on the use of wsse: PasswordText
.

If I understand correctly, an attacker is able to recover the password digested, the only thing to do is to force it brutally (to try all the possibilities until it corresponds to the hash). It seems much safer than sending the password in plain text. I had to miss something.